Duquesne Law Review
Volume 13

Number 2

Article 11

1974

Trusts - Constructive Trust - Implied Contracts - Truth in Lending
Michael T. Reilly

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael T. Reilly, Trusts - Constructive Trust - Implied Contracts - Truth in Lending, 13 Duq. L. Rev. 374
(1974).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol13/iss2/11

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 366

for a determination by the Court of the defendant's potential for
rehabilitation-the precise remedy required by the irrebuttable presumption cases. Yet the Court fails to give this provision its proper
effect and instead upholds the presumption.
The majority opinion, by its failure to apply an intensified meansends examination and by its failure to discuss irrebuttable presumptions, indicates the Court's inconsistency in applying the
"middle-of-the-road" equal protection standard and its willingness
to revert to the traditional "rational basis" test.
Henry Chajet

TRUSTS-CONSTRUCTIVE

TRUST-IMPLIED

CONTRACTS-TRUTH

IN

LENDING-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that
mortgagors, alleging the misuse of escrow funds by mortgagees,
stated a cause of action for breach of an express trust, for imposition
of a constructive trust, and for breach of an implied contract, but
that the allegations, if proven, would not violate the Truth in Lending Act.
Buchanan v. Brentwood FederalSavings & Loan Association, 320
A.2d 117 (Pa. 1974).
Plaintiffs, mortgagors, filed a class action suit in the Common
Pleas court of Allegheny County' against the defendants, their mortgagees, and the Federal National Mortgage Association.' Plaintiffs
sought to force defendants to discontinue the practice of commingling mortgage escrow funds3 with defendants general funds and
1. Allegheny County is one of the four counties in the Pittsburgh, Pa. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
2. At the time of the trial court's ruling, defendants consisted of fourteen federallychartered and thirteen state-chartered savings and loan associations, four national banks,
and one savings bank. Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 P.L.J. 247 (C.P.
Allegh. Co. 1974).
3. Monthly tax and insurance payments are either held in escrow or capitalized. Under
the former method, used by most mortgage lenders, mortgage payments are credited to three
separately maintained accounts-principal, interest, and escrow. When taxes and insurance
premiums are paid, the escrow account is debited and any remaining balance carried forward.
Since taxes (in Allegheny County) and insurance premiums are paid annually, the lender has
some portion of the funds available to him for all or part of the year. Escrow funds are "freely
commingled with the mortgagee's general funds and used to earn income." 320 A.2d at 12122 (footnote omitted).
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investing them for their own profit; plaintiffs sought to require defendants to account to them for any profits derived from this practice. Four separate theories were advanced by the plaintiffs to support their claims: (1) that mortgagees' failure to hold the monthly
escrow payment exclusively for the purpose of paying the mortgagors' taxes and insurance premium was a breach of an express trust;'
(2) that defendants' use of the escrow funds required imposition of
a constructive trust on the earnings realized from the investment of
such funds;' (3) that, by discontinuing capitalization6 of their
mortgagors' escrow accounts, certain defendants were in breach of
an implied contract; and (4) that defendants' present practice of
handling escrow funds violates the Truth in Lending Act.'
Most of the defendants jointly demurred.8 The trial court, sitting
en banc in equity, sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case.
Capitalized payments are credited to principal, instead of an escrow account. When the
bank pays taxes and insurance premiums, the outstanding loan balance, i.e., the principal,
is debited with an equivalent amount. Since mortgage agreements universally provide that
interest be paid on the outstanding loan balance, the mortgagor benefits by paying less
interest, because the loan balance is lower throughout the year than if capitalized payments
were not credited to principal.
The large number of tax foreclosures during the 1930's led lenders to the concept of paying
a pro rata share of the annual assessed taxes and insurance premiums. Prompt payment of
taxes is important since tax liens are priority liens. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 7102
(1972). Mortgagees also wish to guarantee that there is sufficient insurance to repay the loan
if the property is destroyed. Typically, a mortgagor convenants for the payment of taxes and
insurance and agrees to a default clause allowing the mortgagee, at his option, to advance
these sums, should the mortgagor fail to pay them, or to accelerate the entire debt. See
Comment, Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow Accounts: Judicial and Legislative
Developments, 23 SYRACUSE L. REv. 845, 849 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Syracuse Comment]. The use of escrow accounts has become widespread, since they are required for FHA
insured loans, 24 C.F.R. § 203.23(a) (1974); permitted in VA guaranteed loans, 38 C.F.R.
§ 36.4312(d) (1974); and are required for most conventional loans with high loan-to-value
ratios. Syracuse Comment, supra at 850. See also Homeowners vs. Lenders: A Question of
Interest, CONSUMER REPORTS, March 1973, at 202 [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER REPORTS].
4. As the plaintiffs perceived this relationship, the insurance companies and taxing bodies
were not properly characterized as beneficiaries of the trusts, since the purpose of the trust
relationship was to budget tax payments and insurance premiums, enabling payments to be
made when due, and thus ensurifig that defendants' collateral was protected. "Money held
in trust to pay financial obligations of the beneficiary does not render an obligee a beneficiary
of the trust." Brief for Appellants at 14 n.2, Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
320 A.2d 117 (Pa. 1974). See also 2 A. Scorr, LAw OF TRUSTS § 126 (3d ed. 1967) (incidental
beneficiary not entitled to enforce trust).
5. Plaintiffs advanced this as an alternative to the breach of trust assertion. 320 A.2d at
122.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
8. 121 P.L.J. at 249.
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Plaintiffs appealed.' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 0
BACKGROUND TO

Buchanan

The escrow system has been attacked" in both state" and federal
courts,1 3 as well as in the state legislatures."4 In federal court, mortgagors have filed actions alleging federal causes of action under the
antitrust laws and the Truth in Lending Act 5 seeking, as well, resolution of their state (common law) causes of action for usury, unjust
enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty through the use of pendent jurisdiction.
In Stavrides v. Mellon National Bank and Trust Co.,'8 a leading
9. Plaintiffs appealed under the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 211.202(4) (Supp. 1974) which permits direct appeals from final orders of common pleas
courts in equity actions.
10. Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 320 A.2d 117, 131 (Pa. 1974).
11. Other lending practices have also been challenged. See, e.g., Spens v. Citizens Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. fI1. 1973) (contesting, inter alia, mortgagees'
failure to refund 10% rebate for prompt payment of title insurance fees to mortgagors); Gibson
v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Miller v. Standard Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 347 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (contesting defendants' practice of
collecting amounts in escrow in excess of that required by federal regulation).
12. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972);
Abrams v. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank, 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 114 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1974); Durkee
v. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 17 Il. App. 3d 978, 309 N.E.2d 118 (1974); Zelickman v. Bell Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 13 Ill. App. 3d 578, 301 N.E.2d 47 (1973); Sears v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 1 Ill. App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 (1971); Yudkin v. Avery Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
507 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1974); Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 291 N.E.2d 609 (Mass.
1973); Tierney v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 77 Misc. 2d 284, 353 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Civ.
Ct. Queens Co. 1974); Richman v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Wis. 2d 358, 204 N.W.2d
511 (1973).
13. See Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Foster v.
Maryland State Say. & Loan Ass'n, 369 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C. 1974); Kinee v. Abraham
Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Spens v. Citizens Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Munn v. American Gen. Inv. Corp.,
364 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F.
Supp. 1375 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Graybeal v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.D.R. 7 (D.D.C.
1973); Williams v. American Say. Ass'n, No. CA-3-6350-D (N.D. Tex., March 26, 1973);
Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiarn,
487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973).
14. See generally Syracuse Comment, supra note 3, at 867-70. For a discussion of legislative proposals in Pennsylvania and by the federal government see 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 364-69
(1974). The loss of interest to mortgagors has been estimated to be as high as $100 million
annually. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 3, at 202.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
16. 353 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973). In
Stavrides, plaintiffs' complaint alleged as their "federal causes of action": (1) the changeover
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case involving the same plaintiffs as in Buchanan, the district court
dismissed plaintiffs' claims under the Act, finding that lenders
could disclose credit terms just prior to the "closing"" and that the
defendants' failure to include the required escrow payments in the
computation of the true interest rate did not violate the Act." It also
dismissed plaintiffs' state claims, concluding that the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction, under the causes stated, would be improper."
Defendants' motions to dismiss the alleged restraint of trade 2° and
illegal tying arrangement violations, however, were denied.2
Stavrides is typical of the course generally followed in similar federal cases.22 At this time, only alleged antitrust violations are pending before the federal courts.
from capitalization to the escrow method was a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); (2) defendant's lending practices constituted an illegal
tying arrangement, as well as an illegal reciprocal dealing arrangement, as the credit extension was premised on agreeing to maintain an escrow account; (3) violations of the Truth in
Lending Act. As their "state causes," plaintiffs alleged usury; unjust enrichment; and breach
of fiduciary duty. Stavrides was brought in federal court by the same plaintiffs as in Buchanan concurrently with their court of common pleas action.
Another example of mortgagors filing concurrent state and federal actions in Pennsylvania
is Chevalier v. Baird Sav. Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
17. The Stavrides court held § 1638 & 1639 of the Truth in Lending Act did not require
as complete a disclosure of credit terms as did § 1637, which deals with credit card purchases.
It was permissible, therefore, for mortgage lenders to reveal the credit terms just prior to
"closing." 353 F. Supp. at 1079.
18. The Stavrides court found escrow accounts were within § 1605(e)(3) of the Truth in
Lending Act which specifically excludes such payments from the computation. The identical
argument was before the court in Buchanan, i.e., that escrow accounts do not comport with
the technical definition of escrow. See note 75 infra. But cf. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 463 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that escrow funds were not "assets" for
federal tax purposes, within the meaning of Irr. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 805(b)(4), since Liberty
held the funds as trustee).
19. 353 F. Supp. at 1080. The court held that the decision to exercise pendent jurisdiction
was governed by UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), and found neither the requisite "common nucleus of operative fact" nor the presence of state and federal claims ordinarily triable
in a single proceeding. 353 F. Supp. at 1080.
20. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal
(emphasis
.
added).
21. The court held that, if proven, allegations that defendants' actions were a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade would constitute a per se violation under the Sherman Act. 353 F. Supp. at 1076. Defendants' contentions that their activities were wholly
intrastate did not convince the court. Id. at 1080. The court, however, dismissed the illegal
reciprocal dealing claim. Id. at 1077.
22. See cases cited at note 13 supra. With the exception of Umdenstock v. American
Mortgage & Inv. Co., 363 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Okla. 1973), all cases have denied motions to
dismiss allegations of antitrust violations. Umdenstock dismissed the antitrust claims, rea-
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While federal cases show a substantial uniformity, cases brought
in the state courts differ markedly from one another. There are
several reasons for this. Actions in state courts have relied on traditional common law and equitable remedies, while actions in the
federal court have generally been based on statutes. State courts
have carefully examined the language of the mortgage agreements
to determine the rights and duties of the parties. Each case may,
therefore, be distinguished factually on the differences in language
used by lending institutions in their mortgage agreement forms.23
Finally, state actions are dissimilar due to a variety of interpretations of available remedies. 24 Only Tierney v. Whitestone Savings
and Loan Association5 has expressly found that the defendant held
the plaintiff's escrow payments in trust, and required the defendant
to account for the profits derived from the investment thereof. On
the appellate level, only Buchanan, Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin
Savings Bank,21 and Abrams v. Crocker-Citizens National Bank 7
have held that plaintiffs' complaints sufficiently stated a cause of
soning that since some defendants had always maintained escrow accounts, and others had
changed over from capitalizing, the group could not be guilty of a conspiracy violative of the
antitrust laws. Id. at 1380. But see Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F.
Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973), where the district court found it irrelevant that some defendants
always maintained the escrow system in determining whether a conspiracy had existed among
those defendants who changed from other systems. Id. at 980. In the main, each court dismissing alleged Truth in Lending Act violations and refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction has
relied on Stavrides as determinative of the former issue and the standards in UMW v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), as controlling the latter.
23. These differences can be critically important. Compare Abrams v. Crocker-Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 114 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1974) with Richman v. Security Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 57 Wis. 2d 358, 204 N.W.2d 511 (1973).
24. Comparethe requirements for imposition of a constructive trust in Zelickman v. Bell
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 13 Ill. App. 3d 578, 585-87, 301 N.E.2d 47, 53 (1973) with those in
Buchanan.
25. 77 Misc. 2d 284, 353 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Civ. Ct. Queens Co. 1974).
26. 291 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1973). In Carpenter,real property owners in the City of Boston
brought a class action suit against the defendant-mortgagees, seeking (1) an accounting of
profits earned from the escrow funds, and (2) a declaratory judgment that the funds belonged
to the plaintiffs. The court did not have the mortgage agreements before it. Instead it relied
on the pleadings to determine the parties' rights. There it was alleged that the defendants
held the payment as "escrowees." As in Buchanan, the trial court sustained defendants'
demurrer and dismissed the action.
27. 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 114 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1974). In contrast to Buchanan and Carpenter,
in Abrams the California Appellate Court had a relatively easy time finding that the trial
court had improvidently sustained defendant's demurrer and dismissed the case. Since the
language of the deed of trust (the equivalent of a mortgage) specifically provided that the
bank held plaintiff's monthly payment "as trustee," the court gave effect to the language used
by the parties. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 58-59, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15.
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action. With the exception of these four cases, however, all other
actions have been dismissed by the lower courts, and these dismissals have been affirmed. 8
Although there has been much discussion and some proposed
legislation in this area," only two states have taken steps to require
mortgagees to pay interest on the escrow accounts they hold. Connecticut currently requires that a minimum of 2 per cent per annum
be paid,3" and Massachusetts will soon require some mortgagees to
pay an interest rate to be determined by the mortgagee.3
THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

The impact of Buchanan can be accurately assessed only by care28. See note 12 supra. The scarcity of cases that deal with the issues presented in
Buchanan and similar cases has caused an examination of analogous case law by courts and
commentators. See, e.g., Sears v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1111. App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d
300 (1971); Syracuse Comment, supra note 3; 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352 (1974). Distinctions between
types of deposits have been analyzed and drawn upon. E.g., 5 A. ScoTt, LAW OF TRUSTS, §
530 (3d ed. 1967) (comparing a general deposit, which creates a debtor-creditor relationship,
with a special deposit creating a bailor-bailee relation). A third type, a deposit for a specific
purpose, combines some aspects of both of the above and creates a trustee-beneficiary relation. See In re Interborough Consol. Corp., 288 F. 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 752
(1923); Andrew v. Union Say. Bank & Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712, 263 N.W. 495 (1935) (there is
a judicial presumption that deposits are general, which may be rebutted by clear evidence).
Other cases have, of necessity, dealt with the rights of the parties in the escrow fund. See
In re Simon, 167 F. Supp. 214 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) (bankrupt mortgagor's trustee had no right
to sums in escrow account since funds were not held in a creditor-debtor relation); Winkler
v. Veigel, 176 Minn. 384, 223 N.W. 622 (1929) (mortgagor's deposit to pay property taxes was
a special deposit creating a trust relation and made the mortgagor a preferred creditor of
insolvent mortgagee bank; that the monies were commingled was not controlling); Boyce v.
Nat'l Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 41 Misc. 2d 1071, 247 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
22 App. Div. 2d 848, 254 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1964) (mortgagee held to be trustee of escrow account
funds, and therefore, not liable for uninsured losses occasioned by its not obtaining insurance); accord, Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 463 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1972)
(insurer-mortgagees' escrow accounts not assets for tax purposes because held in trust);
Central Suffolk Hosp. Ass'n v. Downs, 213 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. 1961). But see First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Board of Equalization, 182 Neb. 25, 152 N.W.2d 8 (1967) (escrow
accounts held by bank found to be bank's property for tax purposes). See generally Annot.,
50 A.L.R.3d 697 (1973).
A majority of these cases support the proposition that mortgagors are the beneficial owners
of their escrow accounts. This conclusion is not altered if the mortgagee is considered a
beneficiary of the trust, since his duties as trustee are not diminished. 5 A. ScoTr, LAw OF
TRusTS § 99.1, at 798 (3d ed. 1967).
29. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 3, at 203; N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1973, at 67, col. 5;
Syracuse Comment, supra note 3, at 867-68; 47 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 364-69 (1974).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-83(3) (Supp. 1974).
31. MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 183, § 61 (Supp. 1974). The provision, effective July 1,
1975, applies to all mortgagees doing business within the commonwealth who hold first
mortgages on dwellings with four or less family units.
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fully considering its positive and negative implications. The decision merely set the stage for resolution of several important issues,
both legal and economic." More specifically, Buchanan is significant for two reasons. First, it represents one of a handful of state
supreme court decisions to deal, in any fashion, with attacks on the
escrow system. It is only the second to depart from the relatively
established pattern of upholding the dismissal of mortgagors' actions. Second, the opinion, 3 though principally concerned with the
propriety of the sustained demurrer, dealt with arguments that
could be termed of first impression to the court. To adequately
gauge Buchanan's impact on future causes, it is important to recognize the procedural posture in which the case arose3 4 and to examine
in detail the arguments advanced and the court's response to those
arguments.
The trial court rejected plaintiff's allegation that the mortgage
agreements 35 in question created an express trust for their benefit. 3
The supreme court, in reversing, noted that under Pennsylvania law
neither the presence nor absence in a document of the words trust,
trustee, or beneficiary would control whether the settlor properly
manifested an intent to create a trust; it reiterated the statement
that no particular words or conduct are necessary to create a trust. 37
The court concluded that the test is whether the document, read as
a whole, manifests an intent to impose equitable duties on the transferee to deal with the property for another person's benefit. 8 The
32. Hence, the court's decision could not be viewed as requiring mortgagees to change
their current lending practices.
33. Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion.
34. The court at the outset noted that this appeal was from the sustaining of a demurrer,
and that under Pennsylvania law "[a] demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded facts and
all inferences reasonably deductible from them, but not any conclusions of law." 320 A.2d at
120. Therefore, the court concluded, "[w]here a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should
be sustained, this should be resolved in favor of overruling it." Id. See also Clevenstein v.
Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 401, 266 A.2d 623, 625 (1970); accord, King v. United States Steel Corp.,
432 Pa. 140, 143-44, 247 A.2d 563, 565 (1968).
Thus having established the framework within which plaintiffs' allegations would be
viewed, the court went on to deal with plaintiffs' substantive arguments to determine whether
their complaint stated a cause of action.
35. Generally, the term "mortgage agreement" encompasses two separate agreements.
The borrower executes a personal bond or note evidencing the amount advanced to him by
the lender. He then completes the transaction by signing a mortgage agreement, thereby
pledging his property as security for the repayment of the debt.
36. Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 P.L.J. 247, 252-53 (C.P. Allegh.
Co. 1973).
37. 320 A.2d at 122.
38. Id.
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court also relied on Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank,3"
where, on similar facts, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' action. 0 The
Massachusetts court also directed the trial court to apply a more
liberal trust standard on remand; 4' the standard adopted by the
Pennsylvania courts in Buchanan is essentially the same.' 2
The court also considered and rejected Sears v. FirstFederalSavings and Loan Association, 3 which held that neither a trust nor a
fiduciary relationship exists between mortgagors and mortgagees."
The court focused on the precise language of the agreements and
said that the differences in language made the cases distinguishable. 5 Defendants relied on Sears for the proposition that the word
"pay," as used in the mortgage agreements, created a debtorcreditor and not a trustee-cestui que trust relationship.'" The court,
in rejecting this contention, observed that not all agreements used
the word "pay"' 7 and that the court was not bound at the demurrer
stage to accept such an interpretation. It said that when an agreement was read in its entirety, it may appear that the word "pay"
was used in its generic sense to mean tender, hand over, or deliver.' 8
It also indicated that whether interest was paid on the escrow accounts is an important factor to consider on remand, since the payment of interest on money held by a bank implies a debtor-creditor
relationship. The court implied that the reverse situation39. 291 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1973). See note 26 supra.
40. 320 A.2d at 123.
41. 291 N.E.2d at 614. "Where the mortgagor pays funds to a bank with an expressed
purpose that the funds shall be used for a particular purpose, then the funds may be deemed
to be held in trust." Id.
42. The court used Vosburgh's Estate, 279 Pa. 329, 332, 123 A. 813, 815 (1924) as a
standard. See text accompanying notes 53-55 infra. The court also declined to follow several
cases from other jurisdictions which had reached different conclusions concerning a mortgagor's rights in his escrow fund. 320 A.2d at 123 n.ll.
43. 1 Ill. App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 (1971).
44. Accord, Durkee v. Franklin Say. Ass'n, 17 Ill. App. 3d 978, 309 N.E.2d 118 (1974);
Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 13 Ill. App. 3d 578, 301 N.E.2d 47 (1973). See
also Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 P.L.J. 247, 251 (C.P. Allegh. Co.
1973); Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 697, 701, 702 (1973).
45. 320 A.2d at 123 n.11. In Sears, the mortgage agreement expressly permitted the
mortgagee to choose, at its option, to place the payments (1) in trust without earnings, or (2)
in a tax and insurance account; or (3) to capitalize the payments. 1111. App. 3d at 622, 275
N.E.2d at 302. None of the agreements before the court in Buchanan permitted the mortgagees the options found in Sears.
46. 320 A.2d at 125.
47. Some agreements used "deposit," others "advance." Id. at 125 n.13.
48. Id. at 125.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 374

nonpayment of interest on escrow accounts-may be evidence of
a trust.49 Reversal was also necessary because the trial court's
decree did not sufficiently clarify whether it had reviewed each of
the agreements separately. 0
There is a dichotomy of cases in Pennsylvania on the creation of
express trusts. Some cases require compliance, with the traditional
formalities to create a valid trust,5 while others have taken a more
flexible approach." Buchanan illustrates the flexible approach,
relying on the standard set forth in Vosburgh's Estate5 3 to determine
whether the parties intended to create a trust. 4 The court in
Vosburgh held:
A trust is a relation between two persons, by virtue of which
one of them as trustee holds property for the benefit of the
other. The term "trust" is a very broad and comprehensive one.
Every deposit is a trust, except possibly general bank deposits;
every person who receives money to be paid to another or to be
applied to a particular purpose is a trustee ....
5
The standard has been employed in a variety of situations by the
court.561 It should be noted, however, that the standard was origi49. Id. at 126.n.14; accord,In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 486 F.2d 519, 524 (3d Cir. 1973).
50. The trial court had treated the case as though only one plaintiff and one defendant
were involved. 121 P.L.J. at 248. The supreme court disagreed with this statement, stating
that each type of agreement should be considered separately "because . . . variations may
be crucial to the correct assessment of what relationship the parties contemplated." 320 A.2d
at 125.
51. E.g., Bair v. Snyder Co. State Bank, 314 Pa. 85, 171 A. 274 (1934) (trust must be
created by clear and unambiguous language and cannot arise from any loose statements
admitting possible inferences consistent with other relationships); accord, Leggett's Estate,
418 F.2d 1257 (3d Cir. 1969); Keller v. Keller, 351 Pa. 461, 41 A.2d 547 (1945). See also
Ashman's Estate, 223 Pa. 543, 72 A. 899 (1909) (declaration of trust must be unequivocal).
52. This broad construction of the term "trust" is illustrated by the court's use of Sheet's
Estate, 52 Pa. 257 (1886). In Sheet's Estate, the court held:
One may be made a trustee without calling him such, as readily as a trust can be
created without nominating any one to perform it. To determine whether there is a
trust we are to look, not at the title given, but at the powers and duties conferred. There
is no magic in the word trustee. No particular form of words is necessary to make a
trust.
Id. at 266. See also Socher's Appeal, 104 Pa. 609, 611 (1883) (jurisdiction to enforce performance of a trust arises where property has been conferred upon and accepted by one person on
the terms of using it for another's benefit).
53. 279 Pa. 329, 123 A. 813 (1924).
54. 320 A.2d at 123.
55. 279 Pa. at 332, 123 A. at 815.
56. See Philadelphia v. Mancini, 431 Pa. 355, 246 A.2d 320 (1968) (action to recover city
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nally used in dealing with a procedural issue, not a substantive
claim.57 In Kane v. Bloodgood," where the language originally appeared, Chancellor Kent was concerned with the application of the
statute of limitations to certain types of trusts. The language was
used to define the scope of the term "trust" to determine which type
of trusts was subject to the statute. Early Pennsylvania cases employed the language in dealing with the procedural issue of whether
the "trust" before the court was subject to its jurisdiction." Later
cases have substantively adopted the Vosburgh language. 0
With respect to the balance of plaintiffs' state causes of action,
the majority's thorough treatment of the constructive trust issue
and the views of the remaining justices6 regarding the sufficiency
of this allegation 2 are in accord with Pennsylvania law. 3 Plaintiffs
advanced three theories to justify imposing a constructive trust on
the earnings realized from investment of the escrow funds: (1) that
because of unequal bargaining power, defendants enjoyed a dominant position which gave rise to a confidential relation; 4 (2) that the
defendants were acting as plaintiffs' agents in the collection and
disbursement of escrow funds and, therefore, any profits derived
from these funds belonged to plaintiffs as principals;" (3) that defendants had been unjustly enriched by the retention of profits derived from the escrow funds." In considering each of these theories,
wage tax required to be withheld from employee's gross pay). See also Roger's Appeal, 361
Pa. 51, 62 A.2d 900 (1949) (escheat proceeding); Philadelphia v. Heinel Motors, 142 Pa.
Super. 493, 16 A.2d 761 (1940) (action to recover city sales tax).
57. This is pointed out in Roger's Appeal, 361 Pa. 51, 58, 62 A.2d 900, 903 (1949).
58. 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 110-11, 11 Am. Dec. 417, 421 (N.Y. 1823) (Kent, Ch.).
59. E.g., Warner v. McMullen, 131 Pa. 370, 381-82, 18 A. 1056, 1058 (1890).
60. See cases cited note 56 supra.
61. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
62. Six of the seven justices agreed that, with respect to the imposition of a constructive
trust, plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient.
63. See Clevenstein v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 266 A.2d 623 (1970); Adler v. Helsel, 344 Pa.
386, 25 A.2d 714 (1942) (holding that, on a demurrer, the issue is not whether plaintiff can
recover under the facts averred, but whether the claim as stated excludes a possibility of
recovery under a better statement of facts).
64. The court noted that the existence of a confidential relation was more often a question
of fact than of law and indicated that lack of competition among "sellers," i.e., mortgage
lenders, is probative evidence of unequal bargaining position. Proving a confidential relation
would be sufficient to impose a constructive trust unless the dominant party could clearly
show he had not taken advantage of the relationship. 320 A.2d at 127-28 & n.20.
65. The court declared that if such a relation were proved, a constructive trust could be
imposed because the agent may not use his principal's money for his own benefit. 320 A.2d
at 128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387, 388 (1958).
66. The court stated that "[i]t
is well settled that a constructive trust will arise whenever

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 374

the court established general guidelines to be applied on remand, 7
noting that: (1) a constructive trust, like all equitable remedies,
must remain flexible and readily adaptable to varying conditions;
(2) whether a constructive trust should be imposed could be determined only by resolving whether "the conscience of equity" would
decide that unjust enrichment would occur; (3) that this question
is generally one of fact to be properly determined by a court only
upon consideration of all the facts; and (4) a plaintiff may raise the
issue of constructive trust by merely alleging that the putative trustee has legal title and that, if he retained the property, he would be
unjustly enriched. 8
Plaintiffs argued that certain defendants breached an implied
contract when they unilaterally discontinued their practice of capitalizing" the monthly payments currently held in escrow.70 The
court reviewed the mortgage documents and noted that, since all
the documents did not clearly indicate how the defendantmortgagees were to apply the funds, the plaintiffs were to be permitted an opportunity, on remand, to prove that implied contracts to
capitalize were contained in the agreements.7" On remand, determination of whether certain defendants breached an implied contract
will, of necessity, be decided on an individual basis, with the result
governed by the language of each mortgage agreement.
Plaintiffs also alleged a federal cause of action, asserting that
defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act7" by failing to disclose
73
to plaintiffs the true "annual percentage rate" as required by law.
Although the Act specifically exempts escrow accounts for future
payment of taxes and insurance from the sums required to be included in the computation of the annual percentage rate,7" plaintiffs
contended that defendants' practice of commingling these monthly
justice or the need for fair dealing warrants it," and that the plaintiffs would be permitted
to prove the defendant's unjust enrichment violated public policy. 320 A.2d at 128.
67. See notes 64-66 supra.
68. 320 A.2d at 126-27.
69. See note 3 supra.
70. The trial court had dismissed the contention that the escrow funds should be "recapitalized" on the ground that the agreements contained neither express nor implied language
that would permit such a result. 121 P.L.J. at 257.
71. 320 A.2d at 128-29 & n.24. This contention is applicable only to those defendants who
initially capitalized monthly payments. See, Brief for Appellants at 34, Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 320 A.2d 117 (Pa. 1974).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
73. Id. § 1606.
74. Id. § 1605(e)(3).
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payments with their own funds did not constitute an escrow within
the meaning of the Act.75 Instead, it was urged that these sums
should be declared a "required deposit balance""0 and as such disclosed separately to the prospective borrower. 7 The court perceived
the issue to be whether the tax payments constituted escrows as that
term is used in the Act.7" The court, in rejecting plaintiffs'
arguments," held, in effect, that prior federal litigation in this field
was dispositive of the issue. 0
The majority opinion also dealt with the related procedural questions of whether the present action may properly proceed as a plaintiff class action, and whether it could continue as a defendant class
action.8 ' With respect to the plaintiffs' class action, the court limited the class to groups of mortgagors with substantially similar
escrow payment clauses in their agreements and sought in addition
to ensure that the plaintiffs were representative of the class. 2 As to
the defendant class action, the court declared that substantially
different provisions in the mortgage agreements concerning payment of escrow accounts prevented a permissible defendant class.,
Justice Pomeroy, concurring and dissenting, discussed a proce75. The plaintiffs contended:
The transactions in the instant case have no resemblance to an escrow agreement. The
only contractual agreement is one between a Defendant, the purported depositary, and
the first party borrower, whereby the borrower has been required to make monthly
payments to the Defendant as a condition for securing the mortgage, and the Defendant in turn has agreed to make the payments for the Plaintiff borrower's taxes and
insurance as they become due. The borrower-payor has not entered into an agreement
with the eventual transferees of the funds and has no contract at all with these persons
as regards the deposits with the Defendant and the Defendant's duties as depositary.
Furthermore, the Defendant has no obligation to the municipalities to pay Plaintiff's
taxes and none to the insurance company to pay Plaintiff's premium.
Brief for Appellants at 42-43, Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 320 A.2d 117
(Pa. 1974).
76. "Required deposit balance" has been defined as:
Any deposit balance or any investment which the creditor requires the customer to
make, maintain or increase in a specified amount or proportion as a condition to the
extension of credit . ...
12 C.F.R. § 226.8(e)(2) (1974).
77. Id. § 226.8(d)(2).
78. 320 A.2d at 130.
79. Id. at 130.
80. See cases cited note 13 supra.
81. 320 A.2d at 130.
82. PA. R. Cw.P. 2230 seeks to ensure, where joinder is impractical, that the representative of the class adequately represents the interests of all members. The rule is patterned after
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (governing federal class actions).
83. 320 A.2d at 131.
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dural issue not raised in the majority opinion. In his opinion, the
appeals were procedurally defective in that only one appeal should
have been taken from the dismissal of the action." With respect to
plaintiffs' substantive claims, he viewed the language differences in
each mortgage agreement as precluding a finding that plaintiffs'
complaint sufficiently put in issue the creation of an express trust.
He felt, however, that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to maintain
8
a cause of action on the theory of a constructive trust. 1
IMPACT OF

Buchanan

Because Buchanan arose on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer, the case must be carefully viewed on its facts. Since the trial
court did not consider each agreement individually, the majority
was deciding if any of the agreements was sufficient to support
plaintiffs' claims, not whether the claims could be proven on remand. 8 It is doubtful that the majority was concerned with subtle
8
distinctions.
Should plaintiffs succeed on remand, it would have a primary
impact on three diverse groups-mortgagors, mortgagees, and local
government. While the impact on mortgagees may not be "catastrophic," a term used by one savings and loan association repre84. Id. at 131-32 (Pomeroy, J., concurring & dissenting). He stated that it was unfortunate
that the trial court had not passed on the propriety of plaintiffs' bringing a class action, and
endorsed the majority's limitation of classes on remand. Id. at 134 n.7.
85. Id. at 132-33. In addition to Justice Pomeroy's opinion, Justice Eagen, in a one sentence concurring opinion, expressed his belief that remand was proper because, under the facts
alleged, the complaint may be sufficient to impose a constructive trust. Id. at 134. Chief
Justice Jones concurred in the result. Id. at 131.
86. Thus some of the court's remarks might be viewed as dictum, or not controlling, if a
different fact situation is presented.
87. See, e.g., the court's language concerning use of the word "pay" in the mortgage
agreements. 320 A.2d at 125.
One area not explored in Buchanan was whether a mortgage lender would have the right
to use his mortgagor's escrow account to set off a sum owed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee
under another debt. If no right to set-off exists, it could be inferred that the escrows were a
deposit for a specific purpose. See note 28 supra; Bank of United States v. Macalester, 9 Pa.
475 (1848) (holding no right to set-off existed). An analogous issue was explored in United
States v. Carlow, 323 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Pa. 1971). In that case, the defendant, a retail
merchant, established reserve accounts with his bank to secure repayment of promissory
notes he held and which the bank was discounting. Defendant became insolvent. The bank
set off from the reserve accounts other debts the defendant owed it. In determining whether
the defendant had "property or rights to property" to which a federal tax lien could attach
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321, the court held (1) the issues must be determined by
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sentative, 5 alteration of the present system could have several effects. Abandonment of the escrow system might seriously impair an
institution's entry into the secondary mortgage market, since the
investor's security would be lessened and his risk consequently increased. Several alternatives, including a return to the capitalization method, might accommodate both sides if plaintiffs' claims are
successful on remand. 8 Such a decision would likely lead to substantial revisions in the current mortgage agreements used by individual lenders."
Mortgagors would be able to realize some "income" from their
escrow accounts either through the payment of interest, capitalization, or an accounting for profits. But if mortgagees abandon the
system, many mortgagors could be affected by changed lending
practices in the form of higher interest rates and increased minimum down payment requirements, as well as losing an admittedly
valuable budgeting aid. In view of Buchanan's holding that no permissible defendant class exists, it is doubtful that many mortgagors
will go to the time, trouble, and expense of litigation. While the
court opined that several class actions may be tried together, it is
speculative that this will occur. Thus, potential plaintiffmortgagors may be faced with the prospect of bringing an action
against their own mortgagee without a large class to "spread" litigation costs. The result may be no action at all.'
Pennsylvania law, (2) that, under such law, whether a deposit is general or special depends
on the facts and circumstances surrounding its making, and (3) that reserve accounts solely
established as security for the bank were special accounts under Pennsylvania law. 323 F.
Supp. at 1315.
88. Wall Street Journal, October 26, 1971, at 40, col. 1.
89. For example, one suburban Chicago Savings and Loan Association eliminates the
escrow requirement if the mortgagor opens a savings account with twice the amount of his
annual taxes in it and gives the association the right to make withdrawals if a tax delinquency occurs. "The mortgagor receives 5% interest on the account, [but he] cannot make
withdrawals." CONSUMER REs'orTs, supra note 3, at 204.
90. See, e.g., the agreements before the courts in Sears v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
1 Ill.
App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 (1971) and Richman v. Security Say. & Loan Ass'n, 57
Wis. 2d 358, 204 N.W.2d 511 (1973). Revisions of this sort, if done in concert, however, may
raise questions of antitrust violations.
91. For a brief discussion of some of the class action problems raised in actions by mortgagors contesting the use of their escrow funds see Piltzer v. Independence Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 319 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1974) (trial court's determination that plaintiffs' action was a class
action, was an interlocutory order and, therefore, not appealable under PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 211.202(4) (Supp. 1974)). See note 9 supra. Should existing mortgage agreements
contain severability clauses, a subsequent determination by the courts that the escrow agree-

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 13: 374

There would be a profound impact on local governments if another alternative, monthly tax payments by the mortgagor directly
to the local taxing body, is effected." This alternative would help
to eliminate the "unique economic squeeze" plaintiffs complained
of in Buchanan.3
CONCLUSION

Viewed from the procedural situation the case presented,
Buchanan was correctly decided. Its rationale, employing broad
precedents, illustrates the inherent flexibility of established trust
and constructive trust doctrines. The result in Buchanan, however,
was governed by the language in the agreements before it, and mortgagors filing similar actions should expect close scrutiny of their
agreements by the courts. Decisions are likely to be on a case by case
basis.
While the economic impact of these attacks on the escrow system
may be incalculable, 4 it is doubtful that a large number of lenders
ment clauses were void could raise problems of redetermining the parties' rights and liabilities.
92. Syracuse Comment, supra note 3, at 870 & n.154. See Richman v. Security Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 57 Wis. 2d 358, 204 N.W.2d 511 (1973). Should this alternative be adopted, the
cost of government might be considerably reduced. Currently, local governments in Allegheny
County receive tax payments annually, and some are forced to borrow from lending institutions, incurring interest charges, in order to meet current expenses. Many of these lending
institutions also act as mortgagees, holding escrow funds without payment of interest. Direct
monthly remittances of tax payments to these governmental bodies by the taxpayer would
create a continuing "cash flow" of tax dollars and eliminate the need for such borrowing.
93. The plaintiffs complained that:
Mortgagors, obliged to make equal monthly payments of anticipated real estate
taxes and insurance premiums, are caught in a unique economic squeeze. On the one
hand they lose the use of their tax and insurance money for periods of up to twelve
months when the taxes and insurance are not actually due. During this time the
borrowers could at least have deposited the money in interest-bearing accounts. On
the other hand, municipalities to which the tax payments are ultimately due do not
have the use of the funds paid to the mortgagees and are often called upon to borrow
money (perhaps from the same funds) in anticipation of the receipt of the tax funds.
Plaintiffs are then faced with increased tax costs caused by the borrowing, thus being
forced to make even higher monthly tax and insurancepayments for the following year
with increased loss resulting from being deprived of the use of the additional sum.
Brief for Appellants at 8-9, Buchanan v. Brentwood Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 320 A.2d 117
(Pa. 1974).
94. It is interesting to note that if these escrow funds, whether or not they are held in an
express trust, are found to be a "deposit," they would be insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. (FDIC) as provided by 12 U.S.C. § 264(1) (1970), since 12 U.S.C. § 264
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would abandon the escrow system in view of the current "liquidity
crisis" many lenders are undergoing. 5 Moreover, the payment of
interest on escrow accounts may be a phantom victory for the potential mortgagor entering the housing market, since the increased
costs of "administration" of the system may well be passed on to
him.
Michael T. Reilly

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-

EQUAL PROTECTION-SEX AS A

TAX EXEMPTION-The United States Supreme Court
has held that a Florida statute which grants a tax exemption to
widows does not deny equal protection of the law to widowers who
have no such exemption and who qualify in all other respects.
CRITERION FOR

Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974).
Florida's long extant legislative policy of granting a property tax
exemption to widows is expressed in a current statute which gives
all resident widows a $500.00 exemption from the ad valorem tax.'
Appellant Mel Kahn, a widower, applied to the Dade County Tax
Assessor's Office for this tax exemption. Because the statute does
not offer an analogous benefit to widowers, his application was denied. In a declaratory judgment, the county court found that it was
unable to expand the meaning of "widow" to include both men and
women and held that, since the statutory classification was based
on gender, it was discriminatory and arbitrary and violated the
(c)(12) (1970), defines deposit as including "trust funds whether retained or deposited in...
such bank or . .. another bank."
One case has suggested, though, that if these funds are held under a constructive trust
they are not a "trust" within the meaning of the statute. In re Farmer's State Bank, 675 S.D.
51, 289 N.W. 75 (1939).
95. BUSINESS WEEK, July 6, 1974, at 84.
1. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1885) provided such an exemption. Appellant sought declaratory relief under what is currently FiA. STAT. § 196.202 (1973) which provides:
Property of widows, blind persons, and persons totally disabled-property to the value
of five hundred dollars ($500.00) of every widow, blind person or totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resident of this State shall be exempt from
taxation.

